What is this, I?
Having established that he exists (as discussed in my previous post), Descartes wants to further understand who this I, that exists, is. Seeing as the existence of this ‘I’ is the only thing that is given up until now as indubitable truth, then the only logical continuation is examining this thing that exists.
Descartes proposes a certain methodology for investigating who this ‘I’ is. According to Descartes: “I shall therefore meditate once again about what I formerly believed I was [...] I will subtract anything that can be weakened.” This means that every potential knowledge as to what he might be will be tested against the hypothesis of an all-powerful demon trying to deceive him. This hypothesis gives a sufficient condition for truth. If something survives this hypothesis, then it is true. Could it be that my pen is not blue? Yes, and therefore I doubt it; could it be that nothing physical exists? Yes, and therefore I doubt it; could it be that I do not exist? No, and therefore it is true.
By applying this method, Descartes first eliminates a hypothesis. Descartes eliminates the hypothesis according to which he is a human being and thus a rational animal. By elimination this hypothesis Descartes opposes himself to Aristotle. According to Aristotle, one of the things that distinguish humans and animals is the fact that humans have a rational soul, which animals do not. Descartes cannot accept here that he is a rational animal; this is for two reasons. First of all, it does not survive the hypothesis of an evil genius. Secondly, defining himself as a rational animal would require Descartes to have extensive knowledge on what it is to be rational and what it is to be an animal; however, since he is doubting everything, none of this knowledge is accessible to him now.
Thus Descartes proposes to examine another hypothesis. Before meditating, he spontaneously thought that he was a composite of a body and a soul. Is it possible that he is this composite? Descartes starts by examining the idea that he might have a body. This body he is talking about is material and physical; it has hands, feet, a head and other organs. Does this body survive the evil genius hypothesis? No, because it is possible he is something immaterial. Secondly, Descartes examines his soul. What is a soul? What is obvious about the body, according to Descartes, is that it cannot think, sense or move itself; these are actions of the soul. However, Descartes does not provide more details about the soul. Let’s think about it in terms of movies! When, in the third Harry Potter, a dementor sucks out the soul of Sirius, his body stays behind. His body should become like an empty shell. According to Descartes, this body would be unable to move itself, to sense, to think, and so on. The body would just be matter left behind; it might still be alive, as the heart continues to pump blood, but it is no longer human. The soul is responsible for all actions that the body can not do by itself.
Descartes sets out to examine the actions of the soul and compare them to the activity of the ‘I’ that exists. First of all, the soul puts the body in motion, but insofar as Descartes is doubting the existence of his body, that means that this faculty is not certainly shared between the soul and the ‘I’. The same goes for sensing, as according to Descartes, sensing requires a body. What about thinking? This is shared between the soul and the ‘I’. According to Descartes: “I am, therefore, precisely only a thinking thing, that is, a mind, soul, intellect or reason.” Descartes thus is a thinking thing, something which he thought the soul to be.
This passage from the ‘I’ that exists to being a thinking thing has often been critiqued by several thinkers, for example, Maine de Biran, Husserl and Michel Henry. They argue that by transitioning from “I am, I exist” to “I am a thinking thing”, Descartes has lost the indubitability of the first statement in order to understand himself following the model of physical things. They argue that the cogito is an immediate experience and therefore that it is not a thing; rather, it is felt.
Mental states and thinking
What is a thinking thing? Descartes first defines what actions such a thing is capable of; that is to say, what is thinking? “A thing which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, does not will, and which also imagines and senses.” This presents itself as a finite list. Thinking is no more and no less than any of these actions. Any other action is not thinking. Understanding is a form of thinking, and walking is not.
Descartes does not seem to consider whether the fact that he is doing these actions is indubitable or not. This means that doubting is an action of Descartes, and if Descartes doubts, then he knows with absolute certainty that he is doubting. Descartes has privileged access to his own mental states. While the contents of his mental actions can be doubted, the actions in themselves cannot. Let us say that Descartes understands the Pythagorean theorem: the content of understanding is the theorem, and it can be doubted, if we suppose an evil genius, whether it is true or not. However, the understanding itself is an act of Descartes, and that he performs this act is indubitable. This is also expressed by Descartes with the phrase “I certainly seem to see”. What he sees can be doubted and can be different from what it seems, but the fact that Descartes sees is indubitable according to Descartes. This phrase is understood by Michel Henry to be another formulation of Descartes cogito.
So what have we learnt in this second meditation? First of all, Descartes exists; that is indubitable. And according to Descartes, he is not merely an existing thing; he is a thinking thing, because thinking is that which can not be separated from Descartes at this moment. This thinking thing has various faculties, and Descartes knows indubitably what faculty he is exercising. Descartes has thus progressed a lot since the first meditation and now has a solid starting point for the rest of his metaphysical system.
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